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Abstract. Despite their importance in the study of public administration, political-
administrative relations between Javier Solana and his civil servants have received 
little attention in the scholarly literature. This is unfortunate, because they tell us 
something  about  the  distribution  of  power  within  the  Council  Secretariat,  the 
accountability of his civil servants, and the sort of organisation that Solana leaves 
behind. This chapter gives a first overview of political-administrative relations and 
it makes two observations. First, the relations between Solana and his civil servants 
were atypical in terms of political-administrative relations. The position of the High 
Representative was not quintessentially political and the Council Secretariat was 
not  a  traditional  bureaucracy.  Second,  when  looking  at  the  everyday  relations 
between Solana and his civil servants, this chapter notes that while Solana preferred  
to focus on the 'big picture' in order to establish his political office, he also often 
had to deal with the practicalities of policy-making. Furthermore, his contacts with 
civil servants were limited and based on pragmatic informal relations rather than 
the  formal  hierarchical  lines  of  the  bureaucracy.  This  chapter  finally  notes  that 
Solana spent little political capital vis-à-vis the member states on the development 
of his own organisation. In conclusion, this chapter looks at the Lisbon Treaty and 
analyses what it means for political-administrative relations.
* This chapter is based on (often anecdotal) impressions gained during some hundred 
semi-structured elite interviews with officials from the EU institutions and the member 
states conducted over the period 2006-2010.
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1. Introduction
One of  the  major  achievements  often  credited  to  Javier  Solana,  the  first  High 
Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is the 
development of his supporting bureaucratic organisation (for example, Duke in this 
volume).  When he  was appointed  in  1999,  he  had  some seventy  civil  servants 
working for him. Ten years later when he left office, there were approximately 600-
700 civil servants in Brussels directly reporting to him.1 Through various ways and 
means, Solana thus managed to create a European foreign service of considerable 
size  avant la lettre. These civil servants in the Council Secretariat, together with 
their counterparts in the European Commission services, will make up the bulk of 
the future European External Action Service (EEAS), which is foreseen under the 
Treaty of Lisbon. These bureaucratic developments in the Council Secretariat have 
caught scholarly attention and have been well-covered in the academic literature 
(e.g.  Christiansen  2002;  Dijkstra  2008,  2009,  2010;  Duke  in  this  volume; 
Vanhoonacker  and  Christiansen  2008;  Grevi  2007;  Spence  2006;  Duke  and 
Vanhoonacker 2006; Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer 2010). What has received 
little scholarly attention, however,  is  the day-to-day relationship  between  Solana 
and his civil servants.2
Political-administrative relations are amongst the most important topics in 
the academic study of public administration (e.g. Wilson 1887; Weber 1922; Simon 
1947; Waldo 1948). While the focal points in studying this relationship have shifted 
over time,  the problem of the reconciliation between democracy and bureaucracy 
has  remained  persistent.  The  underlying  idea  when  it  comes  to  political-
administrative relations is that while politicians have a democratic mandate, career 
civil  servants do not. Yet in modern states decision-making and implementation 
have become so complex that politicians have to rely on civil  servants for their 
expertise and administrative capacity. Such asymmetrical dependence, of course, 
comes at a cost. Through the use of “hidden information” and “hidden action”, civil 
servants can affect the contents of policy-making in ways that are beneficial for 
them  (Arrow  1985).  Understanding  the  relations  between  Solana  and  his  civil  
servants in the Council Secretariat will thus not only shed a light on the power 
relations  within  his  organisation  (who  was  calling  the  shots),  and  the  sort  of 
organisation that Solana leaves behind, but also on the accountability of these civil 
servants.
The first observation of this chapter is that the relations between Solana 
and his civil servants were  atypical in terms of traditional political-administrative 
relations. Solana himself had, of course, a political background and profile, but the 
1 The Policy Unit and the Directorate for External Relations were in place from the 
beginning of Solana's term-in-office, but they dramatically increased in size. The Crisis 
Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Military Staff (EUMS), the Civil 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) and the 
offices of the Special and Personal Representatives were furthermore created over time.
2 This chapter is only concerned with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It does 
not discuss the position of the Secretary-General of the Council or the first pillar civil 
servants in the Council Secretariat.
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position of the High Representative as defined in the Amsterdam Treaty was not 
quintessentially political (see also Regelsberger in this volume). As a result, Solana 
had to go to great length to establish his profile and the 'politicalness' of his office.  
Quite similarly, the civil servants in the Council Secretariat were neither standard 
bureaucrats. From the traditional Wilsonian perspective, “administration should not 
be driven by partisan patronage and electoral politics” (Rosenbloom 2008: 57), but 
it should instead be regarded as “a field of business” (Wilson 1887: 20). This means 
clear hierarchies, impersonal offices, civil servants with the same backgrounds and 
training, and career paths based on merit (Weber 1922). Yet the Council Secretariat 
in the Solana decade was anything but. There were continuously rotating seconded 
national officials, which made it very difficult for the Council Secretariat to focus 
on the long-term and to accumulate institutional memory. In addition, while there 
were no strictly personal offices, the Secretariat did contain some national fiefdoms 
and seats, instead of recruiting strictly on merit.
The second observation is that these ambiguities, both at the political and 
the administrative level, affected the everyday relations between Solana and his 
civil servants. In terms of the division of labour, Solana was keen to concentrate on 
the 'big picture', preferring to spend his time on things like the European Security 
Strategy  (ESS)  and  the  Middle-East  Quartet  in  order  to  establish  the  political 
profile of the High Representative. He, however, did not leave everything to the 
bureaucratic level: Solana was also, due to the way the EU is structured, time and 
again  involved  in  the  micro-management  of  the  plethora  of  crisis  management 
operations around the globe. Because of his overloaded agenda, it is worth noting 
that Solana had very little contact with the lower level civil servants. Instead, he 
preferred  to  rely  on a limited number  of  trustees  within his  organisation.  Such 
informal relations were driven partially by his  personal preference, but also the 
result  of  a  structure  with  a  lack  of  hierarchy  and  permanence  in  the  Council  
Secretariat. Finally, it must also be noted that Solana spent little political capital 
vis-à-vis the member states in terms of organisational leadership. During the Solana 
decade, the Council Secretariat with all its reorganisations and with the late arrival 
of civilian structures was a bit of a mess. Most of this had to do with the member 
states,  which were formally in charge of the organisation of the Secretariat,  but 
Solana was also reluctant to confront them over the strategic development of his 
own bureaucracy.
The informal  structures  and personal  networks between Solana and his 
civil servants (and amongst a number of civil servants themselves) undoubtedly had 
their advantages in terms of flexibility, pragmatism, and the ability to get the job 
done. This may have been what Solana valued most about his organisation. It is, in 
this respect, remarkable that Solana's closest aids were exactly the types of people 
capable  of  thinking  outside  the  box  in  a  flexible  non-institutionalised  manner, 
transcending the pillar structure, on which the European Union is based. However, 
now that  Solana has left  office,  and with Baroness Ashton stepping in with her 
Commission-oriented  allegiances,  the  structure  that  remains  behind  –  Solana's 
organisational legacy – is not necessarily the best building block for the future. This 
chapter, however, starts by putting the political-administrative relations in a broader 
context,  before  it  takes  a  look  at  these  relations  between  Solana  and  his  civil 
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servants on a daily basis. It discusses Solana's activities, his day-to-day contacts 
with civil servants and his role in organisational development. In the conclusion, 
this chapter takes a look at the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon on the political-
administrative relations.  
2. Political-Administrative Relations in a Context
Political-administrative  relations  are  one  of  the  most  important  topics  in  the 
academic study of public administration. One strong tradition is, in this respect, that 
of the dichotomy between the political and the administrative level where both do 
not interfere in each others' affairs (Wilson 1887; Weber 1922). While it is common 
wisdom (today) that civil servants do affect decisions made by their politicians and 
that  they engage in bureaucratic politics  of their own, there still  exists a strong 
normative belief that politicians have a democratic mandate and that civil servant 
should act as professionals accepting all directives from the top. It is, however, not 
always easy, as Hill (2003: 95) rightly notes with regard to political-administrative 
relations in the domain of foreign policy, to separate the dog from its tail. This is  
also the case in the relationship between Solana and his civil servants, where it is 
indeed extremely difficult to define and to distinguish between the political and 
administrative level. This section discusses the limits of the dichotomy in the case 
of Solana and his civil servants. Yet rather than to do away with this analytical 
framework, it is more useful to analyse the implications for their relations.
2.1 Javier Solana: a non-elected politician on a bureaucratic seat
Notwithstanding Javier Solana as a person, the position of the High Representative 
was by many standards not a typical political post. Firstly, the High Representative 
under the Amsterdam Treaty had a democratic mandate next to none. It was not an 
elected office nor was the appointment procedure subject to hearings and a formal 
confirmation  by  the  European  Parliament  (cf.  the  members  of  the  European 
Commission).  In  order  to circumvent the indicator  of  holding an elected office, 
which would for example also exclude the United States Secretary of State, Duke 
and  Vanhoonacker  (2006)  provide  indirectly  a  broader  definition  of  politicians. 
They defined the administrative level as that of “players who are not elected or 
those who are not directly nominated by the European Council” (p. 164).3 Since the 
High Representative is nominated by the European Council, he is thus not a civil  
servant, which makes him automatically a politician. As definitions go, this one is 
however  weak.  Firstly,  this  definition  suffers  from  'post-hocism'  in  that  it  is 
explicitly  geared  towards  the  person  of  Solana  rather  than  the  post  of  High 
Representative itself (see also below). Secondly, such definition would also make 
the  post  of  Deputy-Secretary  General  of  the  Council  a  political  one,  while  the 
office-holder, Pierre de Boissieu is a typical bureaucrat.4
Going beyond definitions and looking at it from a political perspective, it 
3 The Secretary of State is, however, subject to hearings by the United States Senate.
4 Not to mention the President of the European Central Bank, who following the German 
system is traditionally independent from politics!
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is worth recalling that when the member states created the position of the High 
Representative  during  the  Amsterdam  summit  (1997),  there  was  considerable 
disagreement on whether the future occupant should be a politician or a bureaucrat 
(Duke 2002; Cameron 2007;  McDonagh 1998; Crowe 2004). France initially had 
its former president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in mind when it first suggested the 
creation of  this position in the preparation of  the Intergovernmental  Conference 
(Moravcsik and Nicolaides 1999). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, thought 
of a bureaucratic figure, such as Lord David Hannay (Missiroli 2004). Germany for 
its part took an integrationist point of view and suggested embedding in the existing 
institutional structures. As a result of this disagreement, the final decision on the 
level of the High Representative was delayed until the nomination of the candidate 
after  the  entry-into-force  of  the  Treaty  in  1999. During  the  press  conference 
following the Amsterdam summit, President Chirac answered in this respect,  on 
whether he was satisfied with the new arrangements, that “it fully depends on the 
person  who  gets  appointed”.5 Yet  given  that  nominations  for  European  posts 
generally result in lowest common denominator agreements, due to the consensus 
requirement, there was no way to assume a high level nomination back in 1997.6 
The intention of the Treaty was thus not to have a strong political position (see 
below why Javier Solana eventually got appointed).
In  addition  to  the  appointment  procedure,  the  contents  of  the  job,  as 
described by the Treaty were not typical for a politician either. In fact, the formal 
competences  of  the  High  Representative  were,  for  obvious  reasons,  extremely 
limited. Solana only formally assisted the Presidency and the Council “in matters 
coming within the scope of the [CFSP], in particular through contributing to the 
formulation,  preparation  and  implementation  of  policy  decisions,  and,  when 
appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, 
through  conducting  political  dialogue  with  third  parties”  (article  26  TEU;  also 
article 18(3)). In this respect, the High Representative hardly had any mandate of 
his own. Compared to many national constitutions, this is an extremely small role 
for  a  politician in  the executive.  One of  the  functions of  national  constitutions, 
despite all their differences, is indeed to define the mandates of the three branches 
of government. Yet with four references in the Amsterdam Treaty, the position was 
ill-defined. The Lisbon Treaty, by contrast, has 72 references to this post.
Finally, one can argue that it is about the person and not about the position, 
that  the position is irrelevant and that  the incumbent gives the position content. 
While  such  actor-oriented  perspective  would  defy  much  of  the  institutionalist 
academic literature to this date (for overviews, see Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 
1999),  it  also  fits  uncomfortably  with  empirical  studies  in  the  context  of  the 
European Union. Smith (2003), for example, notes in his article on the European 
Commissioners  that  their  previous  background  (either  political  or  technocratic) 
does not automatically lead to similar behaviour as a Commissioner. Thus, the fact  
5 NRC Handelsblad (18 June 1997) Hervorming instellingen doorgeschoven; Verdrag 
Amsterdam na moeizaam overleg.
6 The examples are abundant: Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi, José Manuel Barroso, 
Herman van Rompuy, Catherine Ashton were all compromise candidates. Even Jacques 
Delors, as a French finance minister, was initially not seen as a high level candidate. 
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that Javier Solana had been the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General 
of NATO was not directly relevant as to whether he would behave in any particular 
political manner (see Algieri and Stahl in this volume on how his background had 
an impact on his preferences). To conclude, the position of the High Representative 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam was not unambiguously political. The appointment 
procedure  favoured  a  technocrat  and  the  contents  of  the  job  was  unclear.  This 
institutional  setting,  as  the  chapter  will  later  argue,  had  an  effect  on  Solana's 
activities.
Javier Solana was eventually appointed as the High Representative during 
the Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999). That the member states chose the 
serving  Secretary-General  of  the  NATO had  more  to  do  with  the  international 
context than with the fact that  the United Kingdom had completely changed its 
mind. While the Heads of State and Government were meeting in Germany, NATO 
was  carrying  out  its  'humanitarian'  bombing  campaign  in  Kosovo  under  the 
leadership of the United States (24 March-11 June). Solana's success in keeping the 
North  Atlantic  Alliance  together  politically  was  seen  as  a  major  achievement. 
Furthermore, he would give the European Union the profile to the outside world, 
which  it  had  lacked  during  its  various  diplomatic  attempts  to  stop  the  Kosovo 
conflict. Finally, Solana had a good relationship with the United States. It was thus 
the international context of Kosovo, which led member states to appoint a former 
politician as their High Representative.
2.2 Council Secretariat: an administration full of politics
Whereas  the  High  Representative  was  not  a  typical  politician,  the  Council 
Secretariat  is  an  unusual  administration.  Firstly,  there  is  no  clear  bureaucratic 
hierarchy. In addition to the basic Directorate-General for External Relations (DG 
E),  there  are various  bureaucratic  bodies  floating around within the  Secretariat. 
Most of these are directly attached to the office of the High Representative and 
‘under his authority’ (Duke in this volume). While the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is 
formally  a  Directorate-General,  for  example,  it  is  not  mentioned  in  the  official 
organigram amongst the other ‘normal’ DGs of the Council Secretariat. The same 
goes  for  the  oddly-named  Civilian  Planning  and  Conduct  Capability  (CPCC), 
which is the civilian variant of the EUMS and the Operational Headquarters. The 
Policy Unit  is  also directly  attached to  the private office,  but  halfway Solana’s 
term-in-office the decision was made to merge parts of the Policy Unit with DG E. 
Within  the  Policy  Unit,  the  member  states  created  the  Joint  Situation  Centre 
(SITCEN),  which  also  directly  reported to  Solana.  In  contrast,  the  civilian and 
military planning directorates (DG E VIII and DG E IX) are part of the normal 
Directorates-General structure. Given all the bureaucratic developments within the 
Council Secretariat and the unclear hierarchy between all  these bodies, one can 
hardly speak of a stable administration with clear leadership at the top.
Another feature of the Council Secretariat is the extreme variation in the 
appointment  procedures  and  the  backgrounds  of  the  civil  servants  (Juncos  and 
Pomorska 2010). Within the Council Secretariat, there are firstly permanent civil  
servants, who have passed the European Union concours and who are enjoying a 
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life-time appointment. Some of them are working in the external relations services 
and the private office of the High Representative. Secondly, there are the officials  
of the Policy Unit, who are paid for by the Secretariat, but sent by the member 
states. They stay within the Secretariat only for three to four years. Thirdly, there 
are the 'properly' seconded national officials in DG E, who are sent and paid for by 
their member states. They are there for a temporary basis as well and receive an per 
diem from the Secretariat. Fourthly, there are seconded national officials, which are 
paid for  by the Council  Secretariat,  because  seconded national  officials  are not 
allowed  to  negotiate  with  third  parties  on  behalf  of  the  Secretariat.  They  are, 
however,  also  on  a  temporary  contract.  Finally,  there  are  the  national  military 
officers,  who have  been  seconded to the  EU Military Staff  and  who occupy a 
particular seat,  which has been allocated to the member states in  a  system that  
ensures geographical balance. Thus the status of the staff in the Council Secretariat  
varies widely from permanent civil servants to national seats and there is a lot of 
turnover  –  particularly  in  ESDP –  as  a  result  of  the  temporary  nature  of  the 
contracts.
The same can be said about the educational and professional  backgrounds 
of these civil servants, which often vary accordingly. The permanent officials of the 
Council Secretariat are often trained as generalists with a strong European Union 
expertise  and  knowledge.  Many of  the  seconded national  officials,  by contrast, 
come from the foreign (or line) ministries of the member states and thus have a 
background  as  diplomat  with  often  postings  abroad  (though  mainly  Europe) 
(Juncos and Pomorska 2010).  The military officers  are always seconded by the 
national defence ministries and have often very limited experience and affiliation 
with the European Union. This is simply for the reason that European Security and 
Defence Policy is a new phenomenon and that it is for most member states not of 
primary military importance (cf. NATO). The Weberian / Monnet civil servant did 
not exist in the foreign policy services of Council Secretariat.
Another interesting finding of Juncos and Pomorska (2010) is that tasks 
and role perceptions of individual civil servants in the Council Secretariat  strongly 
correlate with their background and their recruitment procedure. National seconded 
officials, who are generally recruited because of their specific expertise, which the 
Secretariat  does  not  possess,  report  that  their  main  tasks  indeed  include  the 
provision  of  information,  expertise  and  analysis.  The  more  traditional  civil 
servants, who entered the Secretariat via the concours, saw administrative support 
and support for the Presidency as significantly more important than their seconded 
counterparts.  Such differences in objectives  and perceptions of function is quite 
different from national administrations. Furthermore, none of the staff members has 
particularly strong allegiances to the Council Secretariat as an institution and they 
do not see it as their own role to defend its territory, which has both positive and 
negative sides to it. This supports the idea that the organisation is fragmented and 
consists of  separate units  and pieces,  which are informally  linked together  in  a 
network type of sense.
3. Political-Administration Relations on a Day-to-Day Basis
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It  can  thus  be  argued  that  the  High  Representative  was  not  a  typical  political  
position and that the Council Secretariat was not a typical Weberian bureaucracy. 
While this  certainly poses  challenges to the  usefulness of  studying the politics-
administration  relations  (and  should  probably  lead  to  a  reconsideration  of  the 
dichotomy), it  is  probably more constructive to analyse the implications for  the 
relationship between Solana and his civil servants in practice. The remainder of this 
chapter looks at how the limits of the political office of the High Representative 
and  the  instability  and  lack  of  continuity  in  the  administration  structured  their 
relations.  It  firstly  discusses  the  division  of  labour  between  the  political  and 
administrative  level,  then  the  direct  contacts  of  Solana  with  civil  servants  and 
finally  it  looks  at  Solana's  role  as  regards  organisational  leadership  over  the 
development of the Council Secretariat.
3.1 Javier Solana's Activities and Priorities
Since the position of  the High Representative was  not unambiguously political, 
Solana went to great length of establishing his political profile (e.g. Crowe 2003; 
interview with Council  Secretariat officials in Brussels 2007, 2009).  One of the 
ways was to try to keep any activity of a bureaucratic nature off his agenda. The 
first  important  thing,  in  this  respect,  which  came  up,  was  the  permanent 
chairmanship of the newly created Political and Security Committee (PSC) (see 
also  Regelsberger  in  this  volume).  While  some  member  states  expressed  their 
preference for the High Representative to be the permanent chair of this committee 
(see Duke 2005; Juncos and Reynolds 2007), Solana was privately happy that he 
was not delegated this task (interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, 
2009). It would have bound him to ambassador gatherings in Brussels twice per 
week.  The  fact  that  the  member  states  eventually  abandoned  the  idea  of  a 
permanent chair and that they opted for a rotating chair, allowed Solana much more 
flexibility to travel over the world and to be the face of the European Union outside  
Europe.
That Solana wanted to deal with the 'big picture' is clear when looking at  
his  activities  in  the Middle-East  Peace Process,  in  the  Iranian  non-proliferation 
dossier, in the Western Balkans and during his mediation activities in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Lebanon and Georgia. Occupying the 
EU seat in the Middle-East Quartet was, in particular, quite a stunning move given  
the highly politicised nature of the dossier, the different preferences of the member 
states and the level of his interlocutors. Yet it is also worth noting that Solana only 
entered the conference table at the Sharm El Sheikh summit (17 October  2000) 
with the likes of President Clinton, Secretary-General Annan, President Mubarak 
and the King of Jordan, after his presence was requested by Clinton, Annan and 
Mubarak. In other words, he was not explicitly sent by the member states or the 
Presidency, although President Chirac (the Presidency-in-office) did let it happen 
and staffed him with his political director. It is furthermore necessary to state that  
this  was his  first  major  appearance  on  the  international  scene  as  the  EU High 
Representative and that it had taken exactly 365 days since he entered office on 18 
October the year before.
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Nonetheless, his presence at Sharm El Sheikh was an important stepping 
stone for the first Quartet 'meeting' in New York, which took place in the margins 
of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  (November  2001).  Secretary-General 
Annan invited Solana rather than the Belgian Presidency-in-office, together with 
Colin  Powell,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  Sergei  Ivanov  and  the  Israeli  and 
Palestinian delegations to discuss the Middle-East  Peace process.  After the 9/11 
attacks, the focus of the International Community had shifted to Afghanistan and 
this was an attempt by the  UN  Secretary-General  to put the Middle-East  peace 
process back on the agenda. A couple of months later (April 2002), the Spanish 
Presidency-in-office decided to host a meeting in Madrid with Powell and Ivanov 
coincidentally passing through the Spanish capital at the same time. This was when 
the  Quartet  was  officially  founded.  This  case  makes  clear  that  third  parties 
preferred to deal with Solana, as the continuous representative from the European 
Union, than with the ever rotating Presidencies, which they often barely knew. Yet 
he was only invited because of his personal network, not because he was the formal 
European Union High Representative (interview with Council Secretariat official in 
Brussels, 2009).
The extraordinary amount of preparatory work, which Solana spent on his 
maintenance and creation of international networks counts for many of the other 
dossiers as well. Particularly in the Western Balkans, Solana was visiting countries, 
where  other  national  foreign ministers  had  long lost  their  interest.  It  is,  in  this 
respect, not a coincidence that his first official trip was to Kosovo after he assumed 
office (interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, 2009). As a result, he 
was  eventually  in  the  position  to  mediate  during  the  conflict  in  the  Former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (FYROM,  2001)  –  together  with  the  NATO 
Secretary-General  –  and  with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  Serbia  and 
Montenegro (see Stahl in this volume). Similarly, when a war broke out between 
Israel and Lebanon in 2006, Solana personally knew the actors (the Lebanese Prime  
Minister Siniora had become even one of his friends) and was capable of limiting 
the damage. The point regarding these regional activities is thus that while Solana 
indeed  at  moments  played  an  important  political  role,  he  could  only  do  this,  
because  of  the  groundwork  he  had  laid  earlier,  which  had  resulted in  valuable 
networks  and  a  detailed  knowledge  of  the  state-of-play.  Stahl  (in  this  volume) 
points, in this regard, to the tremendous amount of visits, he made to the Western 
Balkans, which was incomparable with any national foreign minister.
A similar  thing can  be said  about  his thematic  activities.  Again  Javier 
Solana spend most of his time pursuing big projects, such as the European Security 
Strategy  (ESS),  the  further  development  of  the  European Security  and Defence 
Policy  (ESDP)  through  many  crisis  management  operations  and  the  drive  to 
increase  military  capabilities.  The  European  Security  Strategy  is  particularly 
significant, because it was not a 'second pillar document', but indeed an overarching  
foreign policy strategy. This shows that he was not too interested in the institutional 
boundaries of his function and the difference between Council and Commission 
turf  (see also Allen in this volume).  Furthermore,  he was able to overcome the 
substantial differences between the member states at the time in the wake of the 
Iraq invasion by stressing what they had in common. While the initial idea to have 
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a European Security Strategy came from the big three member states and while the 
content was much a codification of established practices, Biscop (in this volume) 
has pointed out that Solana and his senior advisors were very important in terms of 
the  process  through  which  this  document  came  about.  The  European  Security 
Strategy is therefore rightly seen as one of Solana's most important contributions to 
European foreign policy.
Similarly while ESDP was initiated by France and the United Kingdom in 
St. Malo (1998), Solana at various moments made significant contributions to its 
development. In particular, the proliferation of the large number of operations in the 
early days can be contributed to/blamed on him and his natural ally – France. After 
the first civilian police mission in Bosnia was launched, Solana strongly pushed for 
the European Union to take over NATO operations in the Western Balkans in order 
to establish the first military operations Concordia and ALTHEA under Berlin Plus. 
Similarly, he was supportive of the French idea to 'Europeanise' operation Artemis 
in the Congo, after the request  of the United Nations Secretary-General,  and to 
create modest operations in Georgia, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories (see Major 
in this volume).  Finally, through his close contacts with President Ahtisaari,  the 
European Union ended up monitoring a peace agreement between the Indonesian 
government and the Free Aceh Rebels (see for the individual missions, Merlingen 
and Ostrauskaite 2008; Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009). Solana thought that ESDP 
was a  useful  and necessary instrument  for  the  European Union to  make a real 
impact on the ground and he got it eventually running.
Solana's role  had not only to  do with the  development of  ESDP as an 
instrument, but also with its implementation. One typical example is the ALTHEA 
military operation in Bosnia. With the European Union taking over this operation 
from NATO, Solana thought that it was a good opportunity to use the new-gained 
military leverage to send a clear political signal to the local Bosnian politicians. He 
wanted this operation to be “new and distinct” with specific  focus on the fight 
against organised crime (e.g. Leakey 2006; interviews in Brussels, 2009). This was 
in  his analysis  the one main barrier  blocking Bosnia from further  progress.  He 
furthermore wanted to strengthen the coordinating role of the  European Union’s 
Special Representatives so that both the European Union and all the international 
actors would work better together on the ground. While Solana did not entirely get 
what he wanted – due to the opposition of the Commission and the member states – 
it illustrates the sort of things he was interested in. For Solana, the military mission 
ALTHEA per se was not overly relevant – NATO had done a fine job at creating a  
safe and secure environment – but rather the political leverage resulting from the 
operation, which could be used to put Bosnia further on the road to Europe (ibid.).
Civilian and military capabilities were another focal point for Solana. In 
order to carry out all these operations, the member states would have to make more 
efficient use of their military and civilian resources. Solana felt that they were not 
getting enough operational capabilities for what they paid annually (approximately 
half  of  the  military  budget  of  the  United  States).  Through  endless  capability 
conferences and eventually  the  establishment  of  the  European Defence Agency, 
which  was headed by  Solana  himself,  the  member  states  tried  to  identify  their 
shortfalls and to do something about them. It needs to be said that the result of all 
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these efforts was rather modest apart from the fact that such issues were now under 
discussion. Capabilities were, however, not only about the number of helicopters 
and the efficiency of spending. There was a more political implication. One of the 
reasons why the United Kingdom had signed up for the European Security and 
Defence Policy in the first place was that it saw it as a potential capabilities-driver.  
By reaching results in this regard, the United Kingdom could potentially be kept on 
board. Thus, Solana spent considerable time on this.
Yet despite Solana looking after the big picture in the thematic dossiers, 
again it must be stressed that while he was not micro-managing, he was (too often)  
involved in the details of ESDP operations. This was partially structure-related for 
two reasons. Firstly, the European Union is built on legal bases, which can only be 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. Of particular relevance is the Joint Action 
without which ESDP operations cannot be (pre-)financed. Thus contrary to NATO, 
every single planning document has to go through the Council, which implies that 
technical details reach the political level and that Solana had to be able to brief the 
foreign ministers. Secondly, the force generation process is an important moment in 
the ESDP planning process and comes rather late. This means that after the member 
states have decided to go somewhere, Solana and his staff still  have to find the 
necessary capabilities before the operation can be launched. Since there are almost 
always shortfalls, Solana often ends up calling reluctant defence ministers to ask 
for their contributions. In case of the EUFOR Congo operation (2006), he had to 
beg for one doctor, which none of the member states wanted to deliver, and which 
was eventually sent by Switzerland. In case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, he had to call 
several times President Putin to ask for helicopters. Instead, he probably should 
have been be discussing more pressing concerns.
3.2 Contacts with his civil servants
As a result of his relentless travelling (a total of four million kilometres according 
to  El Mundo) and his many EU meetings, the contacts of Solana with his lower 
level civil servants were minimal.7 Based on 46 interviews with Council Secretariat 
officials,  Juncos  and  Pomorska  (2010)  reported  the  average  number  of  direct 
contacts with Solana to be “less than once per month”. Given that the sample also 
included a number of civil servants in the private office and the Policy Unit, who 
had  more  than  average  access  to  Solana,  the  number  of  contacts  between  the 
standard desk officer and Solana was likely to be close to zero. Interviewees of the 
Council Secretariat (2007, 2009) indeed confirmed that most of the business went 
through the Private Office,  which had a major task in handling his agenda and 
briefings.  Selected officials  from the Policy Unit  sometimes went on trips  with 
Solana, were party to phone conversations, and thus had more access. While these 
findings  are  not  atypical  compared  to  national  administrations,  these  limited 
number  of  contacts  do  point  at  quite  a  strong  dichotomy  between  the  lower 
bureaucratic level and the principal at the top.
The Weberian hierarchy was, however, not completely respected by Solana 
7 El Mundo (1 December 2009) Tras una década, adiós a Solana: 4 millones de kilómetros 
de diplomacia.
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himself.  His  pragmatism and  preference  for  personal  informal  relations  with  a 
number of top civil servants determined to a large extent the outcomes of his policy. 
It is impossible to discuss all his advisors here, but it is important to note that his 
relations with the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council, Pierre de Boissieu were 
far from ideal. Since de Boissieu was in charge of the administration of the Council 
Secretariat and many of the first pillar dossiers, this regularly led to problems. The 
Director-General  for  External  Relations,  Robert  Cooper,  on the other  hand,  was 
since 2003 probably one of the  closest aids of Solana and worked extensively on 
the European Security Strategy. The same goes for the Director of the Policy Unit 
until 2005, Christoph Heusgen, who was one of Solana's main strategic advisors. In 
a  different  way,  Solana  trusted the Deputy-Director  General  External  Relations, 
Pieter Feith, whom he brought from NATO and who was one of these civil servants 
in Brussels capable of getting the job done. However, with the Aceh mission, Feith 
left,  only  to  return  and  to  take  off  directly  to  Kosovo  for  the  more  ambitious 
position  of  double-hatted  International  Civilian  Representative  /  EU  Special 
Representative. 
Other trusted people included notably his spokesperson, Cristina Gallach, 
who was already with him at NATO, and who did a remarkable job establishing his 
political  profile  in  the  media.  During  the  beginning  of  Solana’s first  term,  the 
Director-General for External Relations, Sir Brian Crowe, played an important role, 
although he was more of a traditional Council Secretariat civil servant, who had 
played a leadership role since the beginning of the 1990s. At a later stage (since 
February 2007), the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, Lieutenant-General 
David  Leakey,  became  an  influential  military  advisor.  He  had  been  the  Force 
Commander  during  Operation  ALTHEA,  where  he  had  tried  to  implement  that 
“new and distinct” guidelines of Solana in a rather innovative way (Leakey 2006).  
On the ground in third countries, there were other people, such as Paddy Ashdown, 
the European Union Special Representative to Bosnia,  who had direct access to 
Solana. The main point, however, is that these relations were based on personal 
contacts, which went all the way back to Solana's time at NATO or which he had 
picked up along the way. While all these people were capable of getting the job 
done and were by and large thinking outside institutional boundaries – particularly 
the pillar boundaries – their access to the political level was not based on the office 
they were holding,  to  use Weberian terms.  This  is  not  necessarily  a  bad  thing, 
because these informal networks often led to effectiveness. Yet now that Solana – 
the pivotal person in the network – has left, it is a question what of the network 
remains.
3.3 Limited organisational leadership
Considering all his relentless efforts to put European foreign policy on the map, one 
of the areas where Javier Solana spent little political capital was in the development 
of  his  own organisation.  One official  (interview 2007) noted  that  “while Javier 
Solana has many great gifts, administration and finance are not among them”. He 
simply assumed that these things would be taken care of. Despite the significant 
increases in staff numbers, stated in the introduction (and in Duke in this volume), 
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little organisational strategy was developed over the ten years and reorganisations 
followed one  after  another.  Many of  such  issues  cannot  directly  be  blamed on 
Solana  and  his  staff,  as  following  article  207  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  the 
European Communities (TEC) the Council is responsible for the organisation of the 
Secretariat (and member states have continuously meddled in its affairs), yet the 
point  is  that  he probably could have  assumed a stronger leadership role  in this 
regard. Issues that  point to the weak organisational  development of  the Council 
Secretariat  are,  in  particular,  the very late  arrival  of  civilian crisis  management  
structures,  the  coordination  of  civil-military  crisis  management,  the  non-debate 
over an Operational Headquarters, the relationship between DG E and the Policy 
Unit, and the proliferation of EU Special and Personal Representatives.
The first  issue  is  clearly  the  late  arrival  of  civilian  crisis  management 
structures. It was not until 2007 that the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC) – some call it the Civilian Operational Headquarters (Norheim-Martinsen 
2010)  –  was  created.  This  was  late  by  all  standards.  While  ESDP was  indeed 
initially  conceived  for  military  crisis  management  and  capabilities,  it  is  worth 
recalling that already at Helsinki European Council (1999) reference was made to 
“a non-military crisis management mechanism ... in parallel with the military ones” 
(Presidency  Conclusions,  article  28).  In  addition,  most  of  the  early  ESDP 
operations were civilian operations, while the military operations – apart from the 
French-led Artemis – were conducted through NATO structures. In  other words, 
there was an early need for civilian rather than military structures and they were not 
there. Only when the ambitious executive civilian mission in Kosovo arrived at the 
horizon, the CPCC was created, as the member states could no longer bear the risks 
of failure as a result of a non-professional supporting structure (interviews national 
and Council Secretariat officials, 2007). One national interviewee (Brussels, 2010) 
even states that  the whole structure of civilian crisis management was probably 
conceived around the Kosovo EULEX operation. That it was not a priority for the 
Council Secretariat and Solana is a lost opportunity.
One of the anecdotes surrounding the planning of the Kosovo mission was 
that in the spring of 2006 (thus long before the Ahtisaari report), the Civilian Crisis 
Management Directorate of the Council Secretariat was so understaffed that it had 
to search for innovative solutions to gain more desk officers. One way of doing this 
was through the CFSP budget managed by the European Commission. The CFSP 
budget, however, could only be used for operational expenditure in third countries 
and not for the salaries of desk officers in Brussels. Thus, the Council Secretariat 
decided instead to suggest a very large Planning Team in Kosovo on the ground 
(interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, 2010). This planning team, 
consisting of a few dozen of staff members, effectively did all the planning from 
Pristina, since there was no money to pay for staff in Brussels. Apart from the fact 
that this solution was in the end very expensive, ad hoc and inefficient, it shows the 
problems that civilian crisis management had to deal with. Professional structures 
could have been thought out and proposed at a much more earlier stage.
Another related issue, which never really took off, was the integration of 
civil-military crisis management, supposedly one of the European Union's unique 
selling points unavailable to other international organisations. From the beginning 
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civilian  and  military  crisis  management  were  conceptualised  as  distinct  and 
compartmentalised as such. Probably one of the most typical examples was the lack 
of  cooperation  – and  even  outright  turf  wars  – between EU Police Mission  in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation ALTHEA. Both had the fight against organised 
crime in their mandates,  but rather than to cooperate, they were defending their 
territories to the extent that the contract of the Head of the Police Mission was not  
prolonged  and  that  the  military  operation  was  downsized  (interviews  Council 
Secretariat and Commission officials 2009). Then there was civil-civil cooperation 
between the second and first pillar. Again this was more often complicated than not.  
If  the Commission and Council were not in confrontation with each other,  they 
often ignored the other party and did things in parallel. It was not until the civilian  
Aceh  Monitoring  Mission  (2005-2006)  and  the  military  EUFOR  Tchad/RCA 
operation  (2007-2009)  that  the  relationship  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Council improved. 
Various institutional coordination mechanisms were created in Brussels to 
do something about  this  situation.  Firstly,  there  was  the much mentioned  civil-
military cell, which was created in the EU Military Staff (2004) as a result of a bad 
political compromise to settle difference between the Europeanist and Atlanticist 
orientated  member  states  about  the  necessity  of  an  Operational  Headquarters 
(OHQ). Despite its publicity, the civil-military cell only played a role during the 
operations in Aceh and Sudan (Norheim-Martinsen 2010). So from an operational 
standpoint, its usefulness is in doubt. This had partially to do with its military bias,  
but also with the fact that there was not enough political will among the member 
states for  real  civil-military operations.  A second invention  in order to improve 
civil-military cooperation were the Crisis Response Coordination Teams (CRCTs) 
made up of representatives from the various bodies in the Council Secretariat and 
the  Commission,  which  generally  meet  throughout  the  planning  phase  of  an 
operation.  Its  record  is  mixed.  While  in  the  beginning,  there  was  limited 
coordination  with  the  European  Commission,  Commission  civil  servants 
(interviews  2009)  have  expressed  that  it  was  a  strong  mechanism for  EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA.  Experiences  are  similar  in  the  case  of  the  weekly  Kosovo 
Coordination Meeting in Brussels.
The long discussion over  whether  the  European  Union should have an 
autonomous Operational Headquarters or not, however, continued after the creation 
of the civil-military cell. During the fall of 2006 and the spring of 2007, substantial  
resources were used to create an Operational Cell within the Council Secretariat 
that could be activated on an ad hoc basis. Despite various exercises, it very soon 
became obvious that this Cell would not be used. Instead member states (i.e. the 
United Kingdom) would make their own headquarters available, if there was  any 
need. This is exactly what happened in the ATALANTA piracy operation, where the 
United Kingdom eventually volunteered its Operational Headquarters. Nonetheless, 
the Operational Cell still  is on standby and occupies valuable office space in the 
Council Secretariat building. A decision not to go for such a halfway house could 
have saved a lot of discussion in the Council bodies, a lot of the resources, which 
the European Union Military Staff put in there, as well as the resources spent on all 
the exercises. Solana let these things spin out of control.
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Two mergers have furthermore been on the agenda for a long time. From 
2004-onwards, parts of the Policy Unit were integrated into DG E. It was felt that 
there was duplication between the work of both bodies, particularly in fields where 
DG E  had  a  political  and  non-secretarial  role.  Yet  the  Policy  Unit  was  in  the 
Treaties, which meant that it  could not be abolished and a more recent director,  
Helga Schmidt, has tried to play a more activist role, putting the Policy Unit back 
on the radar screens. Another issue was the long-awaited merger of DGE VIII and 
DGE  IX,  which  became  –  together  with  parts  of  the  EUMS  –  the  Crisis  
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in order  to streamline the early 
planning of operations. One of the functional ideas was to merge the civilian and 
military expertise of both Directorates,  yet  a number of  member states,  notably 
France, saw it as an opportunity to create a stronger planning capability within the 
Council Secretariat. Difficult personal relations also played a role in both mergers, 
as the informal relations at the top were often replicated at a lower level. Some 
people in both crisis management directorates were difficult to coordinate.
Finally, another oddity of the Council Secretariat during Solana's time was 
the proliferation of  EU Special and Personal Representatives.  The advantage of 
these posts was that they brought with them supporting staff members (seconded 
and  paid  for  by  the  member  states),  which  reinforced  the  heavily  understaffed 
Secretariat.  Furthermore,  the  Special  Representatives  gave  Solana  a  channel  to 
influence the situation on the ground in many conflict regions (see Adebahr in this  
volume).  Since  he  did  not  have  direct  access  to  the  Heads  of  Commission 
Delegations, this was very useful. Similarly, the various Personal Representatives – 
from counterterrorism to non-proliferation and parliament relations – served their 
purposes and strengthened the capacity of the Council Secretariat. That having been  
said,  it  was not  an optimal  situation with eleven Special  Representatives flying 
around the globe on top of the Commission Heads of Delegation. One of the points 
Baroness Ashton made during her parliamentary hearings was that she would cut 
back on the number of EUSRs.
To conclude, one can say that the Council Secretariat under Solana was not 
an  extremely stable  organisation with a  clear  strategy on its  own development. 
Civilian crisis management structures arrived too late, civil-military coordination 
never took really off  (despite  it  being a selling point),  discussions were  instead 
about the possibility of an Operational Headquarters, the various mergers brought 
instability, and the role of the Special and Personal Representatives was not always 
clear. It has been stressed that this cannot solely be blamed on Solana himself, as it  
was often the member states that meddled in the Secretariat's affairs, but a bit more 
organisational leadership would probably have helped things.
4. Conclusion: Towards Mature Political-Administrative Relations? 
This  chapter  has  discussed  the  political-administrative  relations  between Solana 
and his civil servants. It has noted that their relationship was atypical compared to 
national administrations in that the position of Solana was not strictly political and 
that  the  Council  Secretariat  was  somewhat  different  from  traditional 
administrations. It has also discussed political-administrative relations on a more 
15
everyday basis. It has described that while Solana's emphasis was on big picture 
projects and political guidelines, he had to put great efforts into building his own 
personal network and profile. He was invited to many important gatherings on that 
basis  and  not  as  a  result  of  the  weight  of  his  office.  Furthermore,  Solana  was 
sometimes dragged into technical issues, which required his attention. In his daily 
contacts with his civil servants he preferred to rely on a  small number of close 
trustees, whom he knew would get the job done. These informal relations created 
flexibility and often results. The drawback was that as an organisation the Council 
Secretariat  did  not  always  develop  professionally.  Solana could  have  played  a 
bigger role in this respect.
This analysis also tell us something about the influence of civil servants in 
the Council Secretariat during Solana's term and the (lack of) their accountability. 
Many important decisions – particularly in the field of ESDP – were taken on a 
bureaucratic level often in direct consultation with the member states capitals, over 
which Solana had little control. One of the prominent examples, in this regard, is  
the direct link between France and the French seconded national officials in the 
military planning directorate (DG E VIII), which was extensively exploited during 
the planning of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. With Javier Solana being only 
limited accountable to the national foreign ministers and the rotating Presidency, 
the lack of political oversight over his civil servants was worrying. Solana himself  
was unlikely  to  get  involved into the details  of  ESDP operations,  yet  a  clearer 
hierarchy and less  ambiguous relations between the  political  and  administrative 
level could have helped things.
The  Lisbon  Treaty  entered  into  force  in  December  2009  and  with  it 
Solana's successor, Baroness Ashton took office. The Lisbon Treaty will change 
political-administrative relations in a rather fundamental way. Firstly, the position is 
of  a  much  more  political  nature  than  the position  of  the  Amsterdam Treaty.  It  
became part  of  the  College  of  Commissioners  and  as  such  Baroness  Ashton  – 
although never publicly elected in her  life  – had to participate in the European 
Parliament  hearings  (see  also  Rüger  in  this  volume).  For  these  hearings,  the 
services of the Commission and Council Secretariat prepared approximately 200 
briefings, of which 150 deal with bilateral relations (interview Commission official 
2010). This shows, apart from the magnitude of the job, also the impossible agenda 
that the new High Representative will be faced with. Solana did not have to bother 
about issues as trivial as the Presidency of Honduras, while this was exactly one of  
the questions during Ashton’s first hearing. Given that as Commissioner, she will 
be expected at many Association Councils with third countries, and that as High 
Representative she will have to prepare and chair at least eleven External Relations 
Councils, her agenda will fill up quickly.
With the High Representative's position mentioned 72 times in the Lisbon 
Treaty it is overly codified and this gives her a much clearer description of her job  
than her predecessor had. What is lacking in the Treaty, however, is a description of 
her position vis-à-vis other members of the College, including the President and the 
other  external  relations  Commissioners,  and  the  newly  created  position  of  the 
President of the European Council. These relationships will be defined over time 
and it is not unlikely that given her overloaded agenda, various functions will be 
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taken over by the President of the Commission (e.g. high-level diplomacy), by the 
fellow  Commissioners  or  high-level  civil  servants,  such  as  the  EU  Special 
Representatives. One of the issues, which in this respect was also raised by various 
civil  servants,  is  their  likely  lack  of  access  to  Baroness  Ashton.  A very  senior 
official (interview 2009) noted that he had contact with Solana approximately once 
per  week,  but  that  he  was  afraid  that  his  number  of  contacts  would  strongly 
decrease under the Lisbon Treaty. Turning the argument around, the potential lack 
of  contact  will  also  give  the  new  High  Representative  less  control  over  her 
bureaucrats. She will be less involved and will have less expertise on all dossiers. 
Accountability  issues  thus  remain  a  problem,  something  which  the  European 
Parliament also alluded to.
Whereas  the  High  Representative's  position  has  thus  become  more 
political,  the  administrative  structures  in  the  European  External  Action  Service 
have more features of a typical bureaucracy compared to the Council Secretariat 
(see also Cameron in this volume). While the final structure of the External Action 
Service still has to be negotiated, and while it most definitely will contain many 
seconded national officials, it increasingly looks like the External Action Service is 
going  to  be  a  stable,  hierarchical  and  better  organised  bureaucracy  with 
Commission-like personnel and financial regulations. Like many national foreign 
ministries, it will have horizontal and regional directorates. There are nonetheless 
still a number of outstanding questions mainly relating to the relationship between 
the EEAS and the external relations services of the European Commission. This 
will  definitely  lead  to  new  coordination  challenges.  Yet  political-administrative 
relations seem to become more stable with the EEAS, despite its formal status as a 
sui generis institution.
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